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EXECUTIVE JUSTICE.
"There is no liberty," says Montesquieu, "if the power
of judging is not separated from the legislative power
and from the executive power. If it were joined to
the legislative power, the power over the life and the
liberty of citizens would be arbitrary; for the judge
would be legislator. If it were joined to the executive
power, the judge might have the force of an oppressor.':"
Hitherto the development of our legal system has con-
formed steadily to this notion. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries it was settled that the crown ruled
under "God and the law" and that causes which concern
the life or inheritance or goods or fortunes of the subject
were n6t to be decided by the natural reason of the execu-
tive "but by the artificial reason and judgment of law.",
Legislative justice lingered longer in legislative divorces,
acts of attainder and of pains and penalties, and private
acts of parliament or of legislatures, creating special
rules for particular cases or individuals, or affording
special relief. But the nineteenth century saw the end
of almost all of such legislation. Legislation divorces
were known in New York after the Revolution,3 and in
,Esprit des Lois. liv. XI, c. VI. "Liberty can have nothing to fear
from the judiciary alone, but would have everythin to fear from
the union with either of the other departments." Fedralist, No. 78.
'Conference between the King and the Judges, Xa Rep. 63.
32Kent, Commentaries, 97-
Copyright, x9o7, byJ. B. Lirp:tcorT COmPAxv. All rights reserve&.
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Pennsylvania,4 Maryland,s and Connecticut 6 in the nine-
teenth century. And so late as 1887 the dissolution of
a particular marriage was held a rightful subject of
legislation by a territory of the United States.7 Such
divorces, however, came to an end in England in x856
and are now precluded by constitutional provisions in
the several United States. Acts of attainder and bills
of pains and penalties were not uncommon in America
during and after the Revolution. But the federal con-
stitution put an end to them in America, and English
writers of the eighteenth century regarded them as
vicious in principle and substantially obsolete.9 The
abortive bill of pains and penalties brought against
Queen Caroline is probably the last of its kind. Ad-
justment of claims against the State by legislative as-
semblies still disgraces the public law of many common-
wealths. In England however, by virtue of statutes,
claims against the crown, after a formal. petition of
right and fiat, take the ordinary course of judicial pro-
ceedings.o And the federal government as well as an
increasing number of the states, by providing courts of
claims, have put justice between State and citizen on a
footing of law rather than of politics.
The obsolescence of legislative justice apparently com-
pleted the legal structure founded by fourteenth century
judges,- built up so laboriously by Coke, and fixed in
American institutions by the federal constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. We had achieved in very truth
a rechstat. Our government was one of laws and not of
men. Administration had become "only a very sub-
ordinate agency in the whole process of government."'*
4Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 26o.
sCrane v. Meginnis. x GM J. 474-
6SIarr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541.
Maynard v. Hi, 125 U. S. X90.
sThompson v. Carr, 5 N. H. 3xx, Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, Slegt
v. Kane, 2 Johns Cas. 236, Jack.on v. Sands, 2 Johns Cas. 267.
92Wooddesson, Lectures, 382 et seq.
102 Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution (2 Ed.) 475-
,,e.g. Y. B. Mich. 12 Edw. 3, No. 2s.
22Amos, Science of Law, 397.
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Complete elimination of the personal equation in all
matters affecting the life, liberty, property, or fortune
of the citizen seemed to have been attained. Nothing is
so characteristic of American public law of the nineteenth
century as the completeness with which executive action
is tied down by legal liability and judicial review. The
tendency was strong to commit matters of unquestioned
executive character to the courts, and no small number
of statutes had to be rejected for such violations of the
constitutional separation of governmental powers. But
the paralysis of administration produced by our Ameri-
can exaggeration of the common-law doctrine of su-
premacy of law has brought about a reaction. And
that reaction, just as the last remnants of legislative
justice are disappearing, has brought back the long
obsolete executive justice and is making it an ordinary
feature of our government.
Contemporary legislation shows clearly enough that
the recrudescence of executive justice is gaining
strength continually and is yet far from its end. From
fifteen to twenty statutes giving wide powers of dealing
with the liberty or property of citizens to executive
boards, to be exercised summarily, or upon such hear-
ing as comports with lay notions of fair play, may be
seen enumerated in the reviews of current legislation in
each of the last ten reports of the American Bar Associa-
tion. The report for 1904 enumerates nineteen of them.
The report for 1905 shows at least eighteen. Nor is the
legislature alone in bringing back this extra4egal-if not
anti-legal--element to our public law. A brief review
of the course of judicial decision for the past fifty years
will show that the judiciary has begun to fall into line,
and that powers which fifty years ago would.have been
held purely judicial and jealously guarded from executive
exercise- are now decided to be administrative only and
are cheerfully conceded to boards and commissions.
As yet, the judicial acquiescence in the revival of
executive justice is a tendency only. The courts are
not agreed; some courts hesitate, while some are willing
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to give up everything but formal actions at law and suits
in equity.13 The tendency, however, is well marked.
In general, the cases prior to i88o tend to hold all matters
involving a hearing and determination, whereby the
liberty, property or fortune of the citizen may be affected,'
to be judicial and not capable of exercise by executive
functionaries. Since i88o, the cases, at first requiring
an appeal or a possibility of judicial review, but later
beginning to cast off even that remnant of judicial con-
trol, tend strongly to hold every sort of power that does
not involve directly an adjudication of a controversy
between citizen and citizen-and in the case of disputes
over water-rights and election-contests some which do-
to be administrative in character and a legitimate matter
for executive boards and commissions.
Perhaps the beginning of judicial acquiescence in a
departure from the common-law jealousy of arbitrary
executive action is coincident with the general intro-
duction of an elective judiciary. Certainly the sub-
missiveness of elected judges under legislative encroach-
ments upon the judicial department has been well marked.
After pleading and practice had been developed by
judicial decisions and rules of court for centuries, Ameri-
can courts tamely submitted to legislation prescribing
in minutest. detail every step in procedure. With one
or two solitary protestsZ4 our appellate courts have
acquiesced in legislation prescribing how and when they
shall write opinions and give reasons for their decisions.
Even more, the trial judges in a majority of our common-
wealths have been shorn of their just powers of advising
the jury and have been reduced to mere umpires, in the
interest of unfettered forensic display; and -no protest
has been heard.xs But we are concerned here only with
statutes involving the line between judicial power and
executive power; with cases in which constitutional
23State v. Thorne (i9o) 112 Wis. 81, 87 N. W. 797-
24Houslon v. Williams (1859) i3 Cal. 24, Ex parte Griph (1888)
118 Ind. 83.
, sSee paper of Mr. Justice Brown, Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 1889. 273-
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provisions for separation of powers and committing
judicial functions exclusively to the courts have been
under consideration.
Irrigation statutes afford an excellent example. Dis-
putes over water-rights, where the conflicting claims of
numerous appropriators, who had often "appropriated"
many times over the maximum flow of the stream,
threatened to give rise to multiplicity of suits, were first
taken in hand by equity. The suit to "adjudicate a
stream" became a familiar proceeding. 6 Later the
matter was taken in hand by legislatures qnd statutes
were enacted whereby the power to determine the nature,
priority and effect of the several appropriations and to
apportion the stream was given to a state engineer, or
a state board of irrigation or a state board of control.'7
In 187o, a statute of this character was held unconstitu-
tional on the ground that the power conferred was
judicial'8 . To-day, the courts are agreed that the power
is not judicial and such statutes are upheld.19 Again
the older decisions were reluctant to concede to execu-
tive boards any power of hearing and determining charges
against public officers and of removing them after such
hearing.20 At least one recent authority shows the same
tendency.21 But the recent cases have settled that this
power of removal after investigation may be given to
z6Frey v. Lowden, 70 Cal. 55o, xx Pac. 838, Long, Irrigation, Sec.
95.
, "The legislature, finding the ordinary processes of law and the
actions then known to the courts too expensive and also inadequate
to meet the novel conditions incident to the appropriation of water,
enacted a statute which . . . furnishes an elaborate system of pro-
cedure for the settlement of all questions of priority of appropriation
of water." Long, Irrigation, Sec. 99.
:SThorp v. WVoolman, z Mont. z68.
Z9Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter. (9oo) 9 Wyo. xio, 61 Pac. 258,
Crawford, v. Hathaway (1903) 67 Nebr. 325, 93 N. W. 781, Boise CitJ
Irrigation &5" Land Co. v. Stewart (1904) xo Idaho, 38, 77 Pac. 25, 321.
"They are in the nature of police regulations to secure the orderly
distribution of water for irrigation purposes." Farmers' High Line
Canal 6 Reservoirv SoUAhworth, 13 Col. 111, 21 Pac. 1028.
2oPolice Comm'rs v. Pritchard -(1873) 36 N. J.- L. 1o, State v.
Towne (1869) 21 La. Ann. 490.
sz.Arkle v. Board of Comm'rs (1895) 41 W. Va. 47, 23 S. E. 804.
I 41.
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executive officers or boards." Power to determine who
had the right to vote,2 or to try election contests," was
formerly held to be judicial. To-day it is settled that
executive officers, without any appeal to the courts,
may determine conclusively who are and who are not
citizens."s Election contests may now be determined
by administrative boards.26  It has been decided that
a Secretary of State may hear and determine a county-
seat election contest,' 7 that executive officers may be
empowered to pass conclusively upon disputes as to
nominations for public office,28 and that a canvassing
board may be empowered to determine the cause of with-
holding of returns not received and if they think it due
to an intent to defeat the will of the electors, proceed
to canvass those received.29 As late as 1883, a statute
giving a board of county commissioners power to hear
and determine complaints against holders of licenses and
to revoke licenses accordingly, was held bad as giving
judicial power to executive functionaries.3 Such power
is now regarded as administrative only.31 Few things
are more clearly judicial or more jealously limited by the
courts than the power to punish contempts. Accordingly,
legislative attempts to confer this power on county at-
torneys,3' tax commissioners33 and common councils,34
"Donahue v. TVill County (x88x) xoo IH. 94, State v. Oleson (1883)
zS Neb. 247, z8 N. W, 45, State v. Hawkins (x886) 44 Ohio St. 98, S
N. E. 228, Fidler v. Ellis (1893) 98 Mich. 96, 7 N. W. 33, Cameron v.
Parkr (x894) 2 Okla. 277, 88 Pac. X4, GiW.ert v. Board of Police
Comm'rs (1895) 1x Utah, 78, 40 Pac. 284, State v. Common Coun-
cit (1895) 90 Wis. 612, 64 N. W. 304, Gibbs v. Louisille (x896) 99
Iy. 490 36, S. W. 524.
'sBurkett v. McCarty (x874) zo Bush (Ky.) 378.
24Stone v. Elkins (x864) 24 Cal. :2$.
usU. S. v. Jig Toy, x98 U.S. 253, U. S. v. Sing Tuck, 194U. S. x61,
Lem Moon Sing, v. U. S. zS8 U. S. 538.
26Andrews v. Judge of Probate (z889) 74 Mich. 278,44 N. W. 923
2 Bowen v. C ifton (x898) io5 Ga. 159, 31 S. R. 147.
2SAllen v. Burrow (1904) 69Kan. 812, 77 Pac. 555. . .
sgFeek v. Bloomingdale T. P. (189o) 82 Mich. 393, 47-w.37
3oState v. Brown, 19 Fla. 563.
szHartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Raymond (z888) 70 Mich. 485, 38 N.
W. 474-
*In re Sims (1894) S4 Kan. 1, 37 Pac. 135.
3sEx pane Dol (1870) Fed. Cas. No. 3, 968, Langenburg v. Decker
(r892) 131 Ind. 471, 3z N. R. x9o.
3In re Whitcomb (1876) 120 Mass. 1S.
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have been thwarted by the courts. Yet a preponderancd
of authority concedes that such power may be given to
a notaiy public,35 which is surely no mean entering wedge.'
Recent decisions tell us that power conferred upon a
state board of land commissioners to cancel leases of
state lands for fraud in procuring them is not judicial ;36
that the decision of an executive officer refusing to issue
a patent to state lands is not judicial ;37 and that examin-
ers who pass on one's right to practice a' profession for
which he has trained himself do not act judicially31
How far the exercise of wide powers of determining
title to land under land-registration statutes is judicial,
courts are not agreed.3 9 How far the power to transfer
inmates of a reformatory to a penitentiary, for mistake
as to age, incorrigibility, or like cause, is judicial, is a
matter of dispute.40 Nor are the courts insisting, as
formerly, upon provision for judicial review. A statute
making the decision of a commissioner of navigation
final on all questions of collection of tonnage tax and of
refunding tonnage tax erroneously or illegally collected
has been upheld.41 An administrative officer maybe
authorized to determine finally and conclusively not
only whether an alien has or has not sufficient property
to enter the United States,4 but even whether a person,
who claims to be a citizen and as such to have the right
3sDeCamp v. Archibald (1893) So Ohio St. 618, 3s N. E. xo56,
Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 3 N. W.-929. Contra, Burns v.
Superior Court (1903) 140 Cal. z, 73 Pac. 597.
s6American Sulphur & Mit. Co. v. Brennan (C9os, Col. App.) 79
Pac. 7So.
37State v. Timme (1884) 6o Wis. 344, x8 N. W. 837.
sSEX parle Whitley (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac. 879, In re Inman
(1902) 8 Idaho, 398, 69 Pac. 120, State v. Hathaway, (1892) zzS Mo.
36, 21 S. W. zoS .
s.Tylkr v. Judges of Registration (zgoo) W7s Mass. 71, SS N. E. 8z2,
People v. Simon (1898) 176 Ill. z6s, 52 N. E. 9zo, State v. Guilbed
(1897) 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 55!.
4oSuch power is held judicial and statutes conferring it upon ex-
ecutive functionaries are held bad in People v. Mallory 195. Ill. 582,
63 N. E. 5o8, In re Durnford, 7Kan. App. 89, 53 Pac. 92. Contra,
In re Linden, 112 Wis. 523, 88 N. W. 645.
4North German Lloyd S. S. Co. v. Hedden (z89o) 43 Fed. r7.
48Lem Moon Sing, v. U. S. x58 U. S. 538.
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to enter the United States, is or is not a citizen. 43 The
review of assessments and equalization may be left
finally to a purely administrative board.4" A statute
may confer wide and summary powers of dealing with
property to a board of health without providing for any
appeal.4S
It is instructive to set over against the foregoing de-
cisions the claim made by Coke for the court of King's
Bench:
"This court hath not only jurisdiction to correct errors in judiciall
proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extra-judiciall tend-
ing to the breach of the peace or oppression of the subjects, or raising
of faction, controversy, debate, or any other manner of misgovern-
ment; so that no wrong or injury, either publick or private, can be
done, but that this shall be reformed or punished in one court or other
by due course of law. "46
The new point of view is well expressed in these words:
"The administration of justice, properly so called, involves two
parties, the party plaintiff and the party defendant, a wrong com-
plained of by the former as done by the latter, and a remedy by way
of redress or punishment applied to such wrong. Judicial proceedings
which do not possess these characteristics, however closely in point
of form they may approach to those which do, are essentially different
from the adinistration of justice. "47
To what are we to attribute this radical change of
front? How are we to explain the tendency, judicial
as well as legislative, to rely upon boards and commis-
sions, to forego judicial control over arbitrary executive
action, and to give free rein to summary administrative
powers? Partly, no doubt, the increasing complexity
of life and minute division of labor must be blamed.
Yet this complexity and this division of labor de-
veloped for generations in which the common-law
jealousy of administration was dominant. -Rather, it
seems to me, must we see in this recrudescence of execu-
tive justice one of those reversions to justice without
law which are perennial in legal history and serve, when-
43U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S..2 3 .
44State v. Thorne (x9ox) 112 Wis. 81, 87 N. W. 797.
4sBrown v. Narragansett (1899) 21 R. 1. 503, 44 AtI. 93S-
464 Inst. 71.
47Salmond, First Principles of Jurisprudence (x893) 7S.
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ever a legal system fails for the time being to fulfil its
purpose, to infuse into it enough of current morality to
preserve its life.
Equity, both at Rome and in England, was originally
executive justice. It was a reversion to justice without
law. The prstor interposing by virtue of his imperium,41
the emperor enforcing fideicommissa, "having been moved
several times by favor of particular persons,'1 49 the
Frankish king deciding, not according to law but secun-
dum &equiatem for those whom he had taken under his
special protection,s" and the Chancellor granting relief
"of alms and charitie, "s, acted without rule in accord-
ance with general notions of fair play and sympathy
for the weaker party. The law was not fulfilling its
end; it was not adjusting the relations of individuals
with each other so as to accord with the moral sense of
the community. Hence pretor or emperor or king or
chancellor administered justice for a season without law
till a new and more liberal system of rules developed.
The executive justice of to-day is essentially of the same
nature. It is an attempt to adjust the relations of
individuals with each other and with the State summarily,
according to the notions of an executive officer for the
time being as to what the public interest and a square
deal demand, unincumbered by rules. The fact that
it is justice without law is what commends it to a busy
and a strenuous age. Hence we must attribute the
popularity of executive justice chiefly,- if not wholly,
to defects in our present legal system; to the archaic
organization of our courts, to cumbrous, ineffective and
unbusinesslike procedure, and to the waste of time and
money in the mere etiquette of justice which for historical
reasons disfigures American practice. Executive justice
is an evil. It has always been and it always will be crude
and as variable as the personalities of officials. No one
4sCicero, In Uerrem, 1, 45, 46.
491nst. II, 23, 1.
soGoodwin, The Equity of the King's Court before the Reign of
Edward I, 12.
s'Dodd v. Browning, Calendars of Proceedings in Chancery, I, 'r3.
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who attempts to decide each case pro re nata will be
able to show that "constans et perpetua voluntas suum
cuique tribuens" which is justice. Nothing but rule and
principle, steadfastly adhered to, can stand between the
citizen and official incompetency, caprice, or corruption.
Time has always imposed a legal yoke upon executive
justice and incorporated its results into law. But any
justice is better than injustice. The only way to check
the onward march of executive justice is to improve the
output of judicial justice till the adjustment of human
relations by our courts is brought into thorough accord
with the moral sense of the public at large.s,
Legislatures are pouring out an ever-increasing volume
of laws. The old judicial machinery has been found
inadequate to enforce them. But they touch the most
vital interests of the community, and it demands enforce-
ment. Hence the executive is turned to. Summary
administrative action becomes the fashion. An elective
judiciary, sensitive to the public will, blithely yields up
its prerogatives, and the return to a government of
men is achieved. If we are to be spared a return to
oriental justice, if we are to preserve the common-law
doctrine of supremacy of law, the profession and the
courts must take up vigorously and fearlessly the problem
of to-day-how to administer the law to meet the demands
of the world that is. "Covenants without the sword,"
says Hobbes, "avail nothing. "s3 If the courts cannot
wield the sword of justice effectively, some other agency
will inevitably take it up.
Roscoe Pound.
ss"The decisive reason for such specialization (i.e. the separation
of powers) is not the practical security of civil liberty, but the organic
reason that every function will be better fulfilled if its organ is spe-
cially directed to this particular end, than if quite different functions
are assigned to the same organ." Bluntschili, Allgemeine Statsle.h,
Bk. VII Chap. 7. Hence if such organ fails to perform its functions
in any respect, the practical ground for the separation of powers
ceases to operate.
s3Leviathan, Cap. XIV.
